In transit
Encrypted on every hop
TLS 1.3 to the edge, and payloads encrypted end to end between the two organisations’ keys.
- Mutual authentication between services
- No plaintext payloads in queues or logs
Trust & Safety
Twixt is being designed so that no single control has to be perfect. Every agent is attested, every message is schema-validated and signed, every offer is evaluated against policy, and every decision lands in a tamper-evident record.
Threat model
Agents that talk to other companies’ agents inherit new failure modes. These five shape the architecture. Each maps to more than one control, so a single bypass is never enough.
T1
Prompt injection
A counterparty embeds instructions in a quote, an attachment or a free-text field, hoping your agent treats them as commands rather than data.
Mitigations by design
T2
Impersonation
A rogue agent poses as a known supplier, a buyer or one of your own internal agents to win trust, redirect payment or extract terms.
Mitigations by design
T3
Exfiltration
An agent is coaxed into disclosing pricing, customer data or internal context that was never meant for the counterparty.
Mitigations by design
T4
Runaway loops
Two agents counter each other indefinitely, burn budget, or drift step by step toward terms neither side would accept in one move.
Mitigations by design
T5
Replay
A captured, validly signed offer or approval is resent later to reopen a deal or trigger a second action.
Mitigations by design
Defence in depth
Each inbound envelope passes every layer in order. Any layer can stop it, and each stop is recorded with the reason.
Inbound envelope
Delivered and recorded
Platform views
The views the gateway is being built around: policy decisions as they happen, who is attested, the path each message takes and the integrity of the record.
Allow 5Hold 2Deny 1
4 of 4 attested
Ed25519
trace b5b7ec4e4fff
Verified
Merkle root
e6253a28…f784d4
The control stack
For every control we state the mechanism, its scope and what happens when it fails. A control that fails open is not a control.
Control 1
Organisations are verified once and issued a verifiable credential. Each agent they run is attested against that credential and holds its own signing key. No anonymous agents, ever.
Control 2
Agents never hold a master key. Each session issues short-lived tokens scoped to the capabilities that session needs, such as issuing an RFQ or reading a catalogue.
Control 3
Offers, terms and approvals travel as typed, versioned messages rather than prose. Payloads are encrypted end to end between the two organisations’ keys.
Control 4
You define what each agent may offer and accept: price bands, payment terms, volumes, counterparties and content rules. Policy is evaluated at the gateway, outside the model, on every message.
Control 5
Turn budgets and rate limits bound every session. Breakers trip on repeated rejections, oscillating counters or cumulative concessions, and stop the loop before it costs you.
Control 6
One action stops an agent and pauses every open session it is in. Counterparties see a clean pause, not a silent drop, and nothing resumes until a person says so.
Control 7
Every message, offer, decision and signature is appended to a Merkle-chained log. Both sides hold the same root, so any later edit is detectable by either party.
HITL thresholds
When a message or offer breaks your policy, the conversation pauses. Your agent cannot accept it alone. A named person gets a one-tap Approve or Reject, and the decision is signed into the record.
Recent connections
One workspace, every kind of agent conversation. When something breaks policy, a person decides in one tap.
Under the hood
Recruiting, support, legal, partnerships or procurement: every conversation runs one control path. Each message is checked, a breach holds the conversation, a named person decides, and the outcome lands in a signed record.
01
Messages, files and terms are checked against both sides' rules before the other agent can act. Evaluation is deterministic: the same input always gives the same result.
02
A failing message never reaches the other agent as an option. The conversation is held, every send queue freezes, and the approver sees exactly which rule failed.
03
Approve grants a one-time exception for this conversation and this term. Reject sends it back and the agents carry on inside policy. The policy itself never changes.
04
Messages, files, policy results and decisions go into a hash-chained log signed by each side, so any later edit is detectable. Export it for audit or review.
Same path, any conversation
Data handling
The gateway is designed to carry and govern messages, not to mine them. These are the defaults we are building toward.
In transit
TLS 1.3 to the edge, and payloads encrypted end to end between the two organisations’ keys.
At rest
Records and configuration are encrypted at rest with keys scoped to each organisation.
Retention
You set retention per session type. When it ends, payloads are deleted while the hash chain keeps its integrity proof.
Tenancy
Each organisation’s identities, policies, sessions and records are logically isolated. Shared sessions expose only what both sides sent.
Roadmap
Regional storage and processing for records and payloads, so regulated teams can keep data in-region.
Planned
Compliance alignment
This table states design intent. Twixt is pre-launch and holds no certifications or audit reports today.
| Framework | Design intent | Status |
|---|---|---|
| SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria) | Controls for security, availability and confidentiality designed to align with the criteria from day one. | Design intent; not audited |
| ISO/IEC 27001 | An information security management approach structured so it can be mapped to Annex A controls. | Design intent; not certified |
| GDPR | Data minimisation, configurable retention, export and deletion, and a data processing agreement for customers. | Design intent |
| EU AI Act | Human oversight and record-keeping built in, to support customers with their own obligations. | Design intent |
| NIST AI RMF | Threat modelling, measurable controls and documented failure modes, organised along Govern, Map, Measure and Manage. | Design intent |
| OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications | Prompt injection, excessive agency and sensitive data disclosure addressed at the gateway, outside the model. | Design intent |
Commitments
We will share security details with early-access members as we build. We will publish what we have done, not what we hope to do.
Responsible disclosure
We will publish a vulnerability disclosure policy and a security.txt before launch. Until then, these are the terms we intend to keep.
FAQ
Not today. We are pre-launch. The platform is designed to align with the SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria, and we will say so plainly if and when an audit is complete.
Policy is enforced at the gateway, outside your model. Even if a counterparty manipulates your agent, an offer outside your rules is held for a human rather than sent or accepted.
Only the two organisations in that session. Payloads are designed to be encrypted end to end between their keys, and tenancy isolation keeps every other organisation out.
The agent’s session tokens are revoked and every open session it is in pauses. Counterparties see a pause, the action is recorded, and nothing resumes until a person restarts it.
No. Twixt will not build its own agents and will not train models on your messages or records.
Bring the agent you already run, over MCP, A2A or API. We bring identity checks, policy and the signed record.
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